A cybernetic decision model of market entry by D. Grieco
1 
 
 
 
 
A CYBERNETIC DECISION MODEL OF MARKET ENTRY* 
 
Daniela Grieco 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes a firm’s decision of entering a new market - or staying outside – and 
considers five decision models – optimizing, satisficing, incremental, cybernetic and random - 
and their domain of applicability in order to discuss how fit they are in describing this specific 
decision. As the cybernetic decision strategy appears as the most appropriate to deal with the 
entry decision, the work goes deeper into this model focusing on the degree of uncertainty that 
the environment represents to the decision-makers and to the state of the conflict of interest that 
arise as this decision implies a coordination problem.  
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1. OVERVIEW 
The aim of this work is analyzing a firm’s decision of entering a new market in the perspective 
of the more accredited models of organizational decision behavior. This kind of approach is 
embedded in the “contingency theory of organization” paradigm (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; 
Hofer 1975; Hambrick and Lei 1985; Donaldson 2001) that grounds on the basic property of 
relating the study of organizational structures to the environmental conditions they deal with. 
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Several decision models have been proposed so far in the literature; an alternative and more recent 
way of looking at them is reading these models as behavioral alternatives among which the 
decision-makers can choose. As Mitroff and Betz (1972) point out, each agent has to face a “meta-
decision problem” and follows a particular decision strategy in dependence of the characteristics 
of her task. Moreover, these models show definite properties in dealing with two fundamental 
dimensions of decision-making, i.e. uncertainty and conflict of interest. Hence, I define a specific 
decision strategy - entering a market or staying outside - in terms of three sets of rules concerning 
search, choice and learning (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981); subsequently, I consider five decision 
models – optimizing, satisficing, incremental, cybernetic and random- and their domain of 
applicability (Grandori 1984) and analyze how fit they are in describing this specific decision. 
There are a number of serious disadvantages to misapplying prescriptive decision models. If the 
assumptions are not met, then the models cannot be trusted to provide useful inputs. Furthermore, 
forcing decision makers to adjust to the needs of inappropriate prescriptive models, their 
proficiency can be reduced. That is why it is important to understand the basis of decision 
expertise in order to enhance decision-makers’ abilities.  
 
2. THE ENTRY DECISION 
Market entry and exit decision problems pose a major concern to economists and sociologists 
(Sundali et al 1995). Starting with the work of Chamberlin (1933), economists have pursued 
extensive research of the role of entry in oligopoly and strategic aspects of entry deterrence and 
competition for market shares (see, among others, Geroski 1995; Klepper 1996; Das and Das 
1997). Industrial organization literature conceptualizes the entrepreneurial decision of starting a 
new business as the entry of a new firm into a market: more specifically, Mueller (1991) refers to 
a “firm that supplies a product within an industry without having supplied it previously”. 
According to the neoclassical theory, entry plays a re-equilibrating function: when an industry 
exhibits extra-profits with respect of the market long-run equilibrium (where entry does not 
occur), new firms come in and “erode” these rents. The probability of entry is negatively affected 
by the presence of barriers that might prevent potential entrants to exploit profitable market 
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opportunities and allow incumbent firms to earn super-profits. Thus, it is industry characteristics, 
both in terms of industry profitability and in terms of the level of structural or behavioural barriers, 
that determine or not a firm’s entry decision.  
Sociologists have mostly approached the entry choice empirically, mainly focusing their 
investigation to the analysis of case studies and to archival methods (Hannan and Freeman 1985). 
Market entry problems are also of interest to experimental economists and psychologists studying 
organizational behavior. Recently, industrial economics theories have tried to integrate the 
analysis of entry determinants related to the industrial structure with an investigation of the biases 
and limitations that can affect firms’ decision. Potential entrants’ expectations of success 
determine entry choice, but these expectations may be affected by mistakes that concern one’s 
own abilities and probability of success. The most famous contribution is represented by Camerer 
and Lovallo (1999)’s paper that tests the hypothesis that business failure could be the result of 
entrepreneurs’ overconfidence about their relative capabilities and unreasonable optimism about 
future. This approach moves apart from the traditional “pure economic” one and focus mostly on 
behavioral and cognitive issues: the entry process is analyzed as the systemic result of individual 
entry decisions that turn to be affected by cognitive biases. The authors stress the importance of 
overconfidence in leading the entry decision and show that entrants are able to predict the amount 
of competitors correctly, but lack in evaluating their performance with respect to their peers. Not 
only they overestimate their capabilities, but also seem to reason as they were alone in the 
competitive arena (“reference group neglect” phenomenon). This work opened up a strand of 
literature that involves psychological insights to understand the entry decision (e.g. Moore and 
Cain 2004; Moore, Oesch and Zietsma 2007; Hogarth and Karelaia, 2008). Several studies show 
how entrepreneurs failures in intuitive reasoning may play a role in the findings of a number of 
recent studies in entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs seem to be affected by cognitive biases like the 
ones qualified as heuristics by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982). Cooper, Woo and 
Dunkelberg (1988), among others, show that entrepreneurs perceive their prospects for success 
as substantially better than those for similar businesses. Moreover, their degree of optimism 
appears to be higher if they have already made the commitment to become business owners: the 
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theory of cognitive dissonance studies decision makers’ attitude to bolster or exaggerate the 
attractiveness of an option after it has been chosen (Abelson and Levi, 1985). The traditional way 
to characterize the entry decision involves several implications in terms of uncertainty and conflict 
of interests: I will show that these properties are even amplified if we move to a not purely 
economic perspective. In essence, the long-established method of reading the decision each firm 
faces has be sketched as a choice between entering a market and receiving an uncertain payoff - 
whose magnitude is determined by the decisions of the other firms- or staying out of this market 
and earn a fixed payoff. Uncertainty is related to the former payoff, which may be positive or 
negative, and may or not be private knowledge; moreover, this payoff is a monotonically 
decreasing function of the number of entrants and consequently turns out to be related to the result 
of a non-cooperative game where tacit coordination may emerge or not. This branch of economic 
theory studies experimentally coordination behavior in a class of non-cooperative market entry 
games featuring symmetric players, complete information, zero entry costs and randomly 
presented values of the market capacity. All these simplifying assumptions are removed by the 
more recent approaches, which frequently exhibit the influence of psychological studies. The need 
of referring to an auxiliary perspective emerges from the difficulty that a pure economic approach 
faces in interpreting the data. Many empirical studies show that entry is a pervasive phenomenon, 
as proved by the huge level of the entry rates, which tend to be extremely high independently on 
the sector and the country we consider. Moreover, most new businesses fail within a few years. 
Therefore, entry and exit seem to coexist temporally and spatially, and this stylized fact contrasts 
with the common explanation of entry as driven by expected profits: new firms were thought to 
enter because attracted by the possibility of earning extra-profits in an unexplored sector. The 
number of sustainable firms has to increase until the extra-profits are completely eroded; from 
that moment on, no one wishes to start a business and, moreover, the competition among the 
existing firms drive out the less efficient ones. Entry and exit should therefore occur in different 
moments, but the empirical evidence is strictly different. The entry decision, therefore, must be 
explained in an alternative way. Models of neoclassical flavor, like the ones by Jovanovic (1982) 
and Ericson and Pakes (1994), assume all the firm’s decisions – the entry decision included – as 
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the result of an evaluation by the firm itself about its own performance: as it is not aware of the 
entire information needed to appreciate its efficiency, it is only able to learn – passively or actively 
by means of investment effort - on the basis of market feedbacks. Horvath, Schivardi and 
Woywode (2001)’s model shows the relevance of uncertainty and information disclosure in 
determining entrants’ decision. After observing other firms’ performances, potential entrants 
reduce their uncertainty: the larger the number of firms in the market, the wider information 
available to potential entrants and the higher the frequency of entry choices, that is governed by 
a self-reinforcing mechanism. 
The evolutionary perspective, on the contrary, models the entry decision as the outcome of 
internal routines, defined as choice procedures implemented daily by agents who operate in an 
uncertain and changing setting, but also shaped by the characteristics – in terms of opportunity, 
appropriability, cumulativeness and knowledge – of the external environment.  
 
2.1. A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO ENTRY 
The brief discussion of the previous section shows that many questions of economics cannot be 
answered simply by determining what would be the rational action, but require an understanding 
of the procedures used to reach rational decisions. The “real world” cannot be equated with the 
world as perceived and calculated by the economic agent, whose computation capabilities are 
scarce and whose ability to adapt successfully to a particular situation is determined by the 
efficiency of his decision making and problem solving processes (Simon 1955, 1978). The real 
world is too complex, too uncertain, too rapidly changing to let the objectively optimal actions to 
be always identified and implemented. The birth of a new firm and, more generally, the 
exploration for a new product, resemble the search for a good chess move more than the search 
of a hilltop. Therefore, the computing capabilities and search strategies of firm managers and 
engineers are crucial to any theory of firm or of interfirm competition. If neoclassical perceptive 
rationality presupposed an objective representation of the world, in the form of coherently 
organized – and hopefully true – beliefs, the empirical evidence shows that the representation of 
informational data is often unreliable and incoherent. This attitude derives from the action of 
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different classes of bounds, respectively related to the presence of information costs, to the limit 
to computational capability (and more generally to knowledge reliability) and to the problems 
arising from the paradoxes of choices and impossibility of conflict resolution. 
A fundamental component of the correctness of informational inputs is related to the mechanism 
of memory: the corpus of beliefs, i.e. the factual foundation of rationality, depends on the accuracy 
and reliability of memorization mechanisms. The factual data base used in the inference often 
corresponds only to a part of the beliefs available in long term memory: people cannot gain access 
to a significant part of their knowledge and consequently the resulting inferences are generally 
wrong (Viale 1992).  
These limitations manifestly affect also the entry decision. The excess of unsuccessful entry, in 
fact, witnesses the presence of some distortions in the perception of the opportunity of such a 
choice: otherwise, firms will take into account the high probability of failure and consequently 
try their luck less frequently. An accredited explanation for the frequency of entrants’ collapse 
enlighten the fact that many entry decisions are mistakes, made by bounded rational decision-
makers. The explanation of this behavior is chargeable mainly to two different reasons: entrants 
know their own skills but fail to appreciate how many competitors there will be, or they forecast 
competition accurately but overconfidently think to succeed while most other firms fail. These 
cognitive biases get worsen as uncertainty and conflicts of interest raise.  
 
2.2. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ENTRY   
As decision-making behavior is a function of its environment, in this section I will focus on one 
highly significant aspect of this environment, i.e. on the degree of uncertainty that it represents to 
the decision-makers. 
The definition of uncertainty that usually appears in the literature assumes that all the relevant 
states of nature are known, all the possible relevant alternative actions or choices are known, and 
that the values of each action-state of nature pair are known. The only cause for uncertainty is 
that one cannot predict what particular environment will occur, because the probability 
distribution across the set of possibilities is unknown. But such a definition completely ignores 
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the type of environment in which most organizational decisions take place (Leblebici and 
Salancik, 1981). In fact, in several situations involving organizational decision making, a major 
problem is to establish the values that are to be attributed to the various possible actions/state of 
the world pairs. Even if perfect foresight were feasible, there is still some doubt about the action 
the organization should choose, and that’s due to the fact that the values for any of the individual 
action-state of the world pair are unknown within the predominating utility structure. In addition, 
it’s difficult to determine the whole set of the possible states of nature which might exist in regard 
to a given decision situation: the decision-makers may even ignore what tomorrow might bring. 
Finally, a decision-maker is often aware that she is unaware of the various actions she might 
make: she can generally presume she has the possibility to uncover them, but this determination 
undoubtedly involves a cost of search. Hence we should also consider the uncertainty caused by 
the possibility of an unbounded set of actions available to the decision-maker (Conrath 1967). 
Moreover, uncertainty is not just a property of the environment but also of the observer faced with 
a decision in a given environment. Thompson (1964) argues that decision making involves two 
sources of uncertainty, due to disagreements about cause-effect relations and to disagreements 
about preferred outcomes. Thompson and Thuden (1959) have defined four classes of decisions 
that require different decision strategies and structures. Given agreements about preferences, one 
can use computational strategies when means-ends relations are certain and judgmental strategies 
when they are uncertain. If there were no agreements about preferred outcomes, inspirational 
strategies would prevail when causal beliefs were uncertain, while compromise bargaining 
strategies would otherwise. Each source of disagreement requires not only a different decision 
strategy, but also different organizational structure. The perception of uncertainty comes not from 
an awareness of the environment, but from an awareness of the uncertainty particular to decision 
situations. Consequently, the structural devices and procedures that organizations develop to deal 
with uncertainty come not from a direct association with the global qualities of the environment 
but in response to the different decision situations in the organizations. Therefore, uncertainty is 
a function of both one’s knowledge of cause-effect relationships and the probabilistic conditions 
of the environment within which outcome takes place. 
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2.3. ENTRY AS A COORDINATION PROBLEM 
Most writers assume that each decision is to be made by an entity, a single person or a multiple 
source that is capable to acting as one. The problem of utility function amalgamation is generally 
ignored. In his well known monograph, Arrow (1963) showed the impossibility of deriving, at 
least analytically, a multi-person decision making algorithm that satisfied certain defined criteria 
of reasonableness. Nevertheless, the vast majority of decision making situations involve more 
than one person, they are multiple in character: this is true for the preponderance of the more 
important decisions that are made in an organizational context. Much of the decision theory 
literature, as well as limiting itself to entity decision making algorithms, concentrates on the 
decision itself, ignoring the process by which the decision is reached. In addition, the behavior 
that is elicited during the process of making a decision is likely to influence the decision itself, 
and hence it is worth studying as a factor in the decision. 
Focusing on entry, the problem of coordination emerges at two levels. Does the entry decision 
arise from the systemic interaction among more agents? If so, the problems deriving from the 
conflict of interest would become relevant. But, as the entry decision represent the first decision 
for a firm – at least if we restrict the analysis to greenfield entry - it is likely that the whole 
organization is not yet created but it is originated just when the decision of entry has already been 
taken and therefore turns out to be an entrepreneur’s decision.  
On the second hand, in a broader perspective, the necessity of coordination arises at a market 
level as only a limited  number of operating firms  is sustainable in a market with a fixed 
dimension which may be known – or, more realistically, conjectured - or not. The decision, in 
this perspective, must take into account the expectations about the potential competitors’ 
behavior. This framework has been generally modeled in a context of non-coordination: under 
the usually simplifying assumptions (symmetric agents, perfect information, no entry costs…) 
coordination in a non-cooperative way emerges. But, if we eliminate them to get nearer to the real 
world, the outcome may end in a coordination failure that may reasonably be a coherent 
explanation of the excess entry phenomenon. Each firm tends to make mistakes in estimating the 
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amount of firms that will be taking the same decision and therefore the degree of competition in 
the market. Bounded rational decision makers may have “competitive blind spots” as they fail in 
evaluating the number of competitors and underestimate the amount of entry, so that industry 
profits turn out to be negative. This story becomes even more complex when the market capacity 
is not known –as happens in the real world – not because of a bad forecast, but as a consequence 
of a decision based on a limited set of information. Anyway, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) shows 
that the informational rationality of this forecasts is quite good: subjects are not generally 
irrational in processing information; excess entry is not the result of an underestimate of the level 
of competition. It is another component, namely their overconfidence about their own skills, that 
seems to play a more relevant role. 
 
3. WHICH DECISION MODEL IS THE ‘FITTEST’ ONE? 
The characterization of the entry decision I presented so far had the aim of enlightening the 
properties of the entry decision in terms of uncertainty and conflict of interest. These two 
fundamental dimensions, which are crucial to define any decision situation, strongly contribute 
in determining the choice of the decision model that better represents the strategy we are 
concerned with. In this paragraph, I will briefly recall the distinctive properties of the most 
accredited decision models with the aim of discussing their ability to fit with the connotation of 
the entry decision I previously provided.  
Each strategy can be thought as a set of procedures for relating some outcomes to some objectives 
of the organization in a specific domain of applicability, that requires to be defined in terms of 
uncertainty and conflict of interest (Grandori 1984).  
 In the economic literature concerning decision making, rationality is usually defined in a way 
that implies some forms of optimization such as the constrained maximization of subjective 
utility. The agent choices the unique and the best – and it must be “the best” in any possible case 
– suitable alternative. Outcome probability distributions may be unknown, but the problem 
structure is nevertheless given in terms of the combinations of possible actions and states of 
nature: this implies that a reliable model of the problem can be constructed, if the problem solver 
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is able to define it. If a model of pertinent dependable information is available, the decision makers 
can adopt value maximizing choice rules; moreover, search rules in this framework lead to an 
exploration of the problem space that goes on until enough information is collected to calculate 
the optimum; finally, learning rules are connected with the reevaluation of probability 
assessments on the basis of outcome observations. But, as March and Simon (1958) point out 
“only in exceptional cases, human decision making, whether individual or organizational, is 
concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives”. An optimizing strategy, in 
fact, is not applicable if all the classes of objectives, alternatives and consequences that are 
relevant to solve a problem are not known or if a collective preference function cannot be defined 
as a consequence of the difficulty in representing in it the power goals of all the organizational 
subunits. Entering a new market – in all the issues it implies -  involves a series of combination 
of options that may be considered infinitive. Therefore, this turns to be a sort of ill-structured 
problem, in which the decision situation lies outside the domain of applicability of an optimizing 
strategy: as a result, a decision maker should turn to other strategies.  
The satisficing alternative, suggested by Herbert Simon as a constructive answer to his critiques 
to the neoclassical paradigm - and elaborated coherently with the assumption of the bounded 
rationality criterion - is more strictly related to the psychological theories on perception and 
cognition. The core of his argument relies on the statement that the interaction between individual 
needs and the environmental restrictions generates the aspiration levels; the failure of the 
optimizing paradigm in explaining the decision process is attributable to an overvaluation of the 
human rationality and to a description of human behavior in mechanicistic terms. A satisficing 
strategy, therefore, is applicable in conditions of uncertainty and conflict which are too extended 
to apply an optimizing strategy, as happens when the problem space cannot be completely 
specified. A satisficing strategy can nevertheless produce solutions that are coherent with the 
organization objectives, filling a gap that an optimizing strategy leaves empty. Instead of 
comparing the alternatives, choices rules in this case compare the consequences of each 
alternative with the decision maker’s aspiration level. The problem space is explored only 
partially without pursuing the aim of generating the whole decision tree but just in order to find 
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acceptable alternatives: only when one is found, the search process stops and that alternative is 
retained. The aspiration level is endogenously determined: if acceptable solutions cannot be 
found, decision makers can apply learning procedures to make  the process converge by 
broadening the set of considered alternatives or reducing the aspiration level. On the contrary, 
when discovering satisfactory alternatives is easy, an agent can raise its aspiration level so as to 
generate superior alternatives. In general, a satisficing strategy is effective in situations of conflict 
when an optimizing strategy is not applicable because of the difficulty of not being able to  define 
a collective utility function: a satisficing strategy can resolve many states that are impossible to 
solve in a maximizing framework. The convergence of satisficing to optimal solution on series of 
decisions depends to well-defined and stable problem spaces: if nothing is known about the 
boundaries of the set of relevant alternatives, a rational actor has no reason for stopping at the 
first acceptable solution; moreover, when acceptable solution are not found, there is no rationale 
to modify the aspiration level. A satisficing strategy, therefore, can be applied only if it is possible 
to compare the consequences of single alternatives with aspiration levels, and when it is possible 
to agree on a set of a relevant aspiration level to be satisfied. What about the entry decision? A 
firm- in the person of the entrepreneur- that makes a first move in a completely new activity is 
not likely to be able to define a specific aspiration level, as it usually has no terms of comparison. 
It faces a series of unexplored issues and it typically is not able to infer about its own capabilities, 
as it may be affected by several types of biases like overconfidence. The outcomes related to each 
alternative, moreover, may even not be acknowledged: this may arise from the fact that only one 
option can be pursued and actually evaluated. It can happen that not simply the set of relevant 
alternatives is indefinable: also the consequences of each alternative with respect to some relevant 
aspiration level is unpredictable. In such a situation, even the satisficing strategies are not feasible; 
again, a decision maker should turn to other strategies. 
The incremental strategy can be reconstructed as a set of procedures that are able to deal with 
such conditions. In fact, it is connected with both uncertainty and conflict of interest on the basis 
of a risk-reducing assumption: small moves will not produce unanticipated big effects, 
particularly negative effects about which agents are more concerned. In this way, an incremental 
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strategy protects an organization from consequences on categories of interest that cannot be taken 
into account a priori: this is possible as a priori negotiation costs can be saved and it turns to be 
particularly effective when the interests of the organization’s various subunits are numerous or 
when the attention of the other actors are focused on other problems. The incremental strategy 
requires that the decision maker is able to define at least one attribute for comparing an alternative 
course of action with the existing one: an entrepreneur that decides to enter a new market can’t 
be easily considered aware of the outcomes it would reach if behaving in a different way. A new 
comer has no sufficient knowledge to forecast adequately the response of the market and the 
interaction with the incumbents: that’s the reason why the incremental model is not entirely fit to 
describe the entry decision. Generally speaking, the most feasible strategy is clearly the random 
one, because it does not require any initial knowledge to be implemented. If there is extreme 
uncertainty about preferences, technology and other competitors, an organization can adopt 
random search and choice rules. But it does not make sense when the organization has the 
possibility and the advantage to take into account the already available solutions and the 
experience from the past. The entrepreneur can usually observe, even if only from an external 
perspective, the performance of the incumbents and therefore learn from their mistakes and 
imitate their success: that’s why firms are not likely to adopt a totally random strategy, as they 
are rational – even if bounded - agents that obviously use all the information available to make 
their best choice. These relations between actions and outcomes are exploited by entrants, that – 
at least a posteriori – relate their objectives with incumbents’ performance. In fact, they are 
usually not able to evaluate their own capabilities – as the rise of overconfidence shows – but can 
at least imitate the incumbents’ choices in similar circumstances  and repeat actions with positive 
observed outcomes and avoid actions wit negative ones. When an organization is not even able 
to perform limited comparisons between the existing solution and an incremental alternative, but 
have nevertheless a certain level of initial knowledge, the incremental and the random model seem 
not to fit our characterization of the entry decision, that exhibits some features of an almost blind 
trial- and- error procedures. The cybernetic strategy succeeds in describing the situations of 
uncertainty that can arise when the information about the existing state of affairs is that it works 
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or not: in the case of the entry decision, the entrant observes when a trial succeeds even if it has 
no knowledge of its internal structure, but can only infer something about its own capabilities and 
learn from the incumbents’ experience. As the cybernetic decision strategy appears as the fittest 
to deal with the entry decision, we will devote the following paragraph to go deeper into this 
model, also taking into account the fact that the higher uncertainty the more the decision strategy 
is likely to change into a random strategy. 
 
4. A CYBERNETIC MODEL FOR THE ENTRY DECISION 
As emphasized above, the prevailing paradigms in decision research have limited utility in 
operational domains characterized by high time pressure, uncertainty, and ambiguity, continually 
changing conditions, ill-defined goals, and distributed decision responsibilities (Klein and 
Calderwood 1991). Previous researchers (see Connolly, 1982, among the others) have commented 
on the importance of making research methods more responsive to applied needs. This paragraph 
will go deeper into the cybernetic strategic decision model in order to emphasize its properties in 
dealing with uncertainty and conflicts of interest and to evaluate if it may turn to fit the entry 
decision. Results of decisions are hard to evaluate, thus in the absence of commonly agreed 
criteria, or methods, - which exist in business management - the judgment whether a decision was 
correct or not, depends on the later success (survival) of the respective organization or individual 
politician. The Cybernetic Paradigm is grounded on the bounded rationality concept and the 
cybernetic decision model of Steinbruner (1974). In complex situations decision makers, 
inherently constrained by cognitive and information processing limitations, typically do not 
optimize expected value, – they satisfice, and minimize uncertainty. The word “cybernetics” 
(Weiner 1948) is here used to describe self-repairing systems based on feedback: in fact, more 
broadly, it refers to the study of systems of control and communication in animals and in 
electrically operated devices and – more specifically - to the interaction between automatic control 
and living organisms.  
Cybernetics is considered a key principle recommended for refining and substantiating 
management decision making (Veney and Kaluzny 2005). First cited as a term in 1948 by Weiner, 
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cybernetics has become “popular as a way of defining a methodological approach to a wide 
variety of scientific and management endeavors and is closely linked with general systems theory 
and its application in the social organization” (ibidem). But it is only in more recent years that 
cybernetics has been applied to scientific work and business management to make these more 
efficient.. 
A firm who enters a market is a self-repairing system based on negative feedback that requires an 
understanding of the whole system and its causal relationships: in fact, entrepreneurs tend to shape 
their choices on the basis of the responses from the market previously received by the incumbents 
and try to make a connection between their successes or failure and the internal structure of their 
organization, even if it can be observed only from outside. Systematic attempts by repair are 
usually actions which include amelioration of the others’ observed behavior, i.e. interventions to 
deal with the supposed symptoms or consequences of the fault, but, frequently, not a proper and 
effective treatment of its root causes, as they can be seldom observed from an external point of 
view. Cybernetic self-repair usually implies automation, in the sense that it is possible and 
effective even in the case of lack of conscious and rational input: choices are often made by means 
of the implementation of routines. This kind of learning turns to be necessarily limited, as it 
reflects the information and assumptions that can be extracted from others’ experience – of  course 
not entirely comprehensible - and consequently tends to be less robust than a Olympic rational 
choice. In fact, cybernetic mechanisms achieve uncertainty control by focusing the decision 
process on a few incoming variables and by eliminating entirely any serious calculation of 
probable outcomes as the potential entrants have not the capabilities to do them.  
Decision-making within firms is usually a complex system with multi-factors, many hierarchies 
and many goals. According to Bai and Wang (2008)’s classification, there is some “white 
information” known to people as well as some “black information” that is still unknown to people. 
Nonetheless, more information is “gray” because people can know only a little but cannot know 
it fully, so the creation of a new firm can be looked as a grey system that is complex and changeful. 
how to make full use of some information provided by real data to analyze and instruct actual 
business starting is a problem that should be solved. 
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The entrepreneur who has to decide whether to enter or not is sensitive to a reduced set of 
information that goes into through an established highly focused feedback channel, while many 
factors which actually affect the outcomes have no effect on his decision process. This argument 
may also represent an explanation for failures: decisions are taken only on the basis of a biased 
sample. In fact, potential entrants tend to underestimate the probability of collapse because they 
only look at successful entrants – the ones who survive and remain in the market – and forget the 
high frequency of failure, as the exiting agents’ experience is not immediately visible, through a 
sort of non-purposive adaptation and allowing the use of heuristic procedures for partial 
approaches to the problem. This permits to impose a sort of structure on uncertain situations and 
to reduce uncertainty by categorical inferences rather than through probabilistic judgments.  
Veney and Kaluzny (2005) identify some components of cybernetics that make it of particular 
relevance and value to entrepreneurs. One is that, in any system, there are the interrelated 
variables of inputs, throughputs, and outputs responsible for “a process of accomplishing an end.” 
The authors note that this process is not intended to replace any existing system (like a new entrant 
firm), but to improve or refine one in place by making it more informed and pertinent. Some of 
the aspects of environment the firm faces are regulated and controlled by decisions made on the 
basis of feedback of information about the state of the system. As suggested above, cybernetics 
is largely, though not completely, a monitoring of the “communication of information in any 
system.” This can be done in such a way that intended outcomes can be compared with actual 
outcomes. The cybernetics’ methodology makes this comparison affordable: the gap between 
intended outcomes and actual outcomes can be reduced as much as is possible in the real world 
of entrepreneurs characterized by pressures of “decision making, employee changes, effects of 
new technology and government regulations, and constant competition” (ibidem). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
As economic agents, in general, are not in a position to calculate rationally optimum solutions for 
their problems, the assumption of rational behavior turns to be not realistic.  The analysis 
presented in this paper is meant to recall that a decision maker has to deal with the state of 
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uncertainty and conflict of interest which characterizes a decision situation; often, she has to select 
a feasible strategy that turns to be less powerful, in terms of the quality of possible solution, as 
she is restricted in the resources which can be allocated a priori to information processing. 
In this paper I focus on a specific decision, i.e. the entry decision, and discuss the properties of 
five decision models in describing it, founding that the cybernetic decision strategy seems to be 
the fittest one. In order to exploit the fruitful dialogue between a particular problem and its 
corresponding model, I auspicate to devote further work to investigate the entry decision by going 
deeper into the heuristic procedures that the agents employ in such a domain characterized by 
uncertainty and conflicts of interests.  
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